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Abstract 
Evaluations of competition policy are increasingly common and typically establish 
that consumer bene.ts from detected cases easily outweigh the costs of competition 
authorities (CA). However, such assessments are often driven by data availability 
and only capture a small part of the total impact because they sidestep the di¢ cult 
issue of how to evaluate deterrence. Similarly, they ignore the fact that policy does 
not root out all anti-competitive cases. This paper suggests a broader framework for 
evaluation which encompasses these unobserved impacts. Calibration is difficult 
precisely because we cannot rely on empirical observations on cases which have 
been observed to make deductions about cases which have not (because they are 
deterred or undetected). It thereby confronts the classic sample selection problem 
which is endemic in all studies based on data from CA decisions. Drawing on insights 
from economic theory, it argues that selection bias is likely to be substantial because 
the unobserved cases could well be those which are most harmful. If so, the 
deterrence of anti-competitive mergers may have a much greater positive impact, but 
the effects of non-detected cartels may be more serious than is usually supposed. 
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Abstract
Evaluations of competition policy are increasingly common and typically
establish that consumer benets from detected cases easily outweigh the costs
of competition authorities (CA). However, such assessments are often driven
by data availability and only capture a small part of the total impact because
they sidestep the di¢ cult issue of how to evaluate deterrence. Similarly, they
ignore the fact that policy does not root out all anti-competitive cases. This
paper suggests a broader framework for evaluation which encompasses these
unobserved impacts. Calibration is di¢ cult precisely because we cannot rely
on empirical observations on cases which have been observed to make deduc-
tions about cases which have not (because they are deterred or undetected). It
thereby confronts the classic sample selection problem which is endemic in all
studies based on data from CA decisions. Drawing on insights from economic
theory, it argues that selection bias is likely to be substantial because the unob-
served cases could well be those which are most harmful. If so, the deterrence
of anti-competitive mergers may have a much greater positive impact, but the
e¤ects of non-detected cartels may be more serious than is usually supposed.
Keywords: competition enforcement, impact assessment, selection bias, cartels,
mergers
JEL Classication codes: K21, L44, H11
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1 Introduction
A policeman happens upon a drunk crawling on his hands and knees under a street-
lamp on a darkened stretch of sidewalk. When he inquires, the drunk explains that
hes searching for his lost keys. The policeman promptly kneels down and begins
searching as well. After theyve scoured the nearby pavement and gutter several times
over the policeman thinks to ask, Are you sure this is where you lost your keys?
The drunk replies, Oh no, I lost my keys about fty yards back. He gestures at
the darkened street behind him. Well, then, why are you searching here?asks the
policeman. The man replies, The light here is so much better.
With the increasing prominence of competition enforcement throughout the world,
competition authorities (CA) and academics have begun to devoting increasing e¤ort
to estimating its impact on economic welfare. Although there are some dissonant
voices,1 most evaluations are very positive, suggesting that the costs of competition
policy are more than balanced by the benets it brings.2
Very often, empirical assessments take the form of ex-ante impact evaluation in
which the CA estimates, using conservative assumptions, the consumer benets of
the cases it has intervened during the year. Although fairly rough and ready, these
evaluations suggest that the benets to consumers from the activities of the CA
more than outweigh their cost, usually by an order of magnitude. For example,
impact evaluation for the EU in 2010 suggests that consumers beneted from the
removal of overcharges by cartels that were detected and prohibited by the European
Commission (EC) to the tune of e7.2 billion; and the benets of remedying/blocking
anti-competitive mergers were e4.2-6.3 billion. The Commissions costs (DGCOMP)
were around e100 million in that year.
This paper starts from the premise that competition policy probably does pro-
vide good value for money and that impact evaluation of the sort just described are
1For example, Crandall and Winston (2003) stridently reject any positive impact of competition
policy. The balance is redressed by Baker (2003) in the same journal issue, who paints a far more
positive picture.
2See for example the ECs 2007-2010 Annual Activity Reports, the USDOJ Antitrust Divisions
Performance Budget Congressional Submissions for 2008-11, or the OFTs Positive Impact for 2012.
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valuable, not only for advocacy purposes but also because it encourages the moni-
toring of activity and prioritisation within the authorities. However such studies are
based only on the cases that the CA prosecutes/intervenes: cartels which it busts,
anti-competitive mergers which it blocks or remedies, and abuses of dominance it
removes - we call these the observed cases. Inevitably however this raises the obvi-
ous question: what about the cases that go unobserved, because they are deterred?
After all a major function of any law is to deter antisocial behaviour, and this is
hopefully the most important function of competition policy. It is often suggested
that the magnitude of deterred harm probably far exceeds that from harm removed
by direct intervention,3 but this is rarely if ever quantitatively factored into pol-
icy evaluations. But it also raises a second question: what about a second type of
unobserved case - those which the CA fails to detect, even although they involve
anti-competitive harm? In e¤ect, these represent a foregone opportunity, or even
failure of policy; again, this is never quantied, although the magnitudes involved
also could be substantial.
The starting motivation for the current paper is that ideally policy should be
evaluated not only on the basis of the observed(the detected and intervened), but
also taking account of the unobserved (the deterred and the undetected). This
leads to the thought that a more encompassing approach to policy evaluation would
be to ask rst how much potential for anti-competitive harm is there out there in
an economy? and then assess the success of policy by asking "how much of that
potential harm is avoided and/or removed by the presence of competition law and
the activities of competition authorities?" The rst question is reminiscent of an old
literature, provoked by Harberger (1954) which attempted to quantify the "social
costs of monopoly, although our approach is very di¤erent from that literature.
Undoubtedly such an approach is ambitious and speculative - ultimately, we can
never know how many cases remain unobserved because they are deterred or not
detected. Moreover, even if we know how many cases are unobserved, there is a
potential sample selection issue - the characteristics of the unobserved may di¤er
signicantly from the observed. Equally however the potential insights on how policy
3See for example Werden (2008), Geroski (2004, p.3) and Baker (2003, p.40).
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impacts are far wider reaching than from merely asking, as in a conventional impact
assessment, whether policy generates benets which exceed its costs.
The paper presents a conceptual framework for assessing the full impact of com-
petition policy in this way, by taking into account the deterred and undetected as
well as the detected. It marshals what we do know- stylised facts from existing
academic and policy literatures, alongside what it is reasonable to infer from theory
about what we do not know - in particular, the nature of the underlying population of
potential cases, and how samples are drawn from it, in the form of cases detected by
the CA. Simple numerical simulations are conducted within this framework and these
suggest that, while the benets of deterrence, especially for merger enforcement, are
considerable. It is also likely that considerable harm may remain unremedied due
to the non-detection of cartels. Moreover, in both respects simple estimates of de-
terrence and detection rates, based on estimating or guessing how manycases are
involved may seriously under-estimate the magnitudes of harmbecause many of
the cases we do not observe will be far more harmful than those we observe. We
emphasise that these simulations are indeed very speculative and just a rst step.
Nevertheless, they help focus on what should be the priorities in future research.
1.1 Previous literature
The policy evaluations mentioned above have taken a variety of forms. Some by the
agencies themselves, have provided estimates of the total impact of all cases they
have enforced, others focus more specically on types of policy, e.g.. just mergers or
cartels, and others estimate the impact of individual interventions (individual merg-
ers or cartels). Quantitative methods vary widely, including di¤erence-in-di¤erences,
event studies, simulations and surveys. See Ormosi (2012) and Davies and Ormosi
(2012) for summaries of these various literatures. However, all these works are con-
strained by the same limitation, driven mostly by data availability inferences are
made on the basis only of the sample of cases in which the CA has intervened, and
fail to take account of unobserved cases.
There are also valuable empirical contributions in the wider literatures on both
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deterrence and detection. For mergers, one strand in the academic literature makes
inferences on the rate of deterrence by examining the serial correlation in the number
of intervened cases over time. In general, this approach is problematic because the
number of detected cases is an ambiguous indicator of deterrence - a reduced number
could imply either increased deterrence or a reduction in the detection rate. This is
less of a problem for mergers if the rate of detection can be assumed constant, which
is likely for regimes with compulsory pre-merger notication rules. Clougherty and
Seldeslachts (2013), Barros et al. (2010), and Seldeslachts et al. (2009) exploit this
feature to identify the deterrent e¤ect of merger policy in the US and EU, and conrm
that lagged detection does impact on current deterrence, although not necessarily in
the composition (degree of harm) in those cases.
In the cartel literature, a commonly cited statistic, originating from the early
work of Bryant and Eckard (1991) is that, in a given year, only 13-17% of cartels are
detected. More recently for Europe, Combe et al. (2008) conrm a similar magnitude
using the same method.4 However, these estimates are derived from information on
cartel duration if we know that cartels last on average for 7 years, it follows that
in any one year only one seventh of cartels will be detected. This statistic therefore
only estimates the conditional probability conditional on the cartel eventually being
detected. Ormosi (2013) proposes an alternative method which draws an analogy
with capture-recapture analysis in ecological science. His work provides estimates
of how detection rate changes over time, which - used together with the change in
the number of detected cases - may tell us something about the rate of deterrence.
However, this approach also relies on cartels which are eventually caught, and still
leaves open the question of how many and what types of cartels are never seen
because there are deterred or never detected.
Most immediately relevant to the aims of the current paper are some survey stud-
ies by the CAs themselves which are designed to estimate deterrence and sometimes
detection rates. Deloitte (2007), commissioned by the OFT in the UK, involved
interviews/telephone surveys of competition practitioners (lawyers and economists)
4Lande and Connor (2012) provides an exhaustive survey of all estimates including those derived
from surveys.
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and of companies. From the survey of legal advisers, it reports that, for each merger
blocked or modied by the CA, there were at least another 5 proposed mergers that
were abandoned or modied on competition grounds. On detection, the survey sug-
gests that the number of under the radarmergers (i.e. undetected by the OFT) was
at least as high as the number which are blocked or modied following intervention.5
On the other hand a study by the Dutch CA (NMa), der Noll et al. (2011), based on
surveys of companies, reports that only 5 per cent of all notied mergers had been
modied prior to notication, and that 13 per cent were deterred completely in an-
ticipation of the NMas intervention. For cartels the Deloitte (2007) study reports an
analogous multiplierof 5:1. In a follow-up larger survey along similar lines, also
commissioned by OFT, London Economics (2011) reports much higher deterrence
multipliers, 28 deterred cases for every detected case.6 Similar surveys conducted by
der Noll et al. (2011) from the NMa found that 60% of cartels were deterred and
about a third of the undeterred cases was detected.
At rst sight, multipliers derived from such surveys provide a straightforward
route for converting the estimated magnitudes of impact from observed CA inter-
ventions into estimates of both the magnitudes of deterred and undetected cases
- although survey results based on subjective assessments are inevitably open to
doubt, especially when, as here, estimates di¤er so noticeably between the UK and
the Netherlands.7 But even accepting such multipliers at face value, there remains
the potentially serious possibility of sample selection bias. Even if we know that for
every cartel detected there are another 5 which are deterred a 5 which go undetected,
we can not deduce that the magnitudes of undetected and deterred cartel harms are
each 5 times greater than the CAs estimates of the savings it achieves from the
5Pre-merger notication is not compulsory in the UK. Below, we generally assume that the CA
detects all anti-competitive mergers.
6However, this gure does not account for non-detection. For example if only, say, 1 in 5 cartels
are detected, then for every cartel formed there are only5.6 deterred.
7Some of the di¤erence may be due to a di¤erence in the interpretations of deterrence. For
example the Dutch survey presented participants with a specic scenario, assuming among other
things a merger which would increase price by 10%, and respondents had to decide whether they
would be deterred. The UK survey was not so specic, and thus deterrence might be interpreted
as including more extreme possibilities, such as a 2-to-1 merger proposal.
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cartels it detects, because the observed sample may not be representative of the full
population.
This paper confronts this sample selection problem, and, in that sense, is of
wider relevance than just the narrowly dened policy evaluation literature. There
is a signicant body of empirical research in Industrial Organisation which employs
datasets of competiton cases investigated and intervened by CAs, and such data have
provided a rich source of information on cartels (typical overcharge, duration, struc-
tural characteristics etc.), mergers (price e¤ects, e¢ ciency, likelihood of unilateral
and coordinated e¤ects etc.), and other areas of policy. While many studies in that
literature acknowledge the possibility of sample selection bias, one can only speculate
on just how important it might be for many of the conventional wisdoms that are
derived from that literature, for example, on cartel duration and overcharge or the
price raising e¤ects of anti-competitive mergers.
1.2 Structure of the paper
Section 2 denes terms and introduces a simple framework which relates the number
of detected cases to an underlying population of all potential anti-competitive cases
that would occur in the absence of competition policy. Using simple multipliers of the
type discussed above, this provides rough estimates of the size of the observed sample
as a proportion of the population, when measured by the number of cases. But these
may be seriously misleading as estimates of measures of the magnitudes of total pop-
ulation harm, unless the sample is representative of the population. The remainder
of the paper argues that this is unlikely . Section 3 draws on previous literature
to propose that the population of potential anti-competitive harm will be positively
skewed; if so, non-random selection could lead to quantitatively very serious bias.
Section 4 surveys existing theoretical literature to propose some likely properties of
the samples of mergers and cartels which are observed in CA interventions. Section
5 translates into a simple sampling problem in which there is di¤erential sampling,
rst non-parametrically and then in the special case where the population is lognor-
mal. As an alternative, an Appendix posits an alternative skewed distribution, the
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Pareto curve. Section 6 calibrates using, as an illustration, data on merger and car-
tel enforcement by the European Commission. Section 7 explores the likely impact
of allowing for Type 1 errors in merger control. Section 8 concludes and points to
directions of our further work.
2 Framework
Figure 1 describes a stylised classication of all potential, privately protable, cases
in a given economy for a given point in time (say year). These represent all cases in
which rm behaviour would cause consumer harm, and which would actually occur
in the absence of competition enforcement.8 These include cartels, anti-competitive
mergers and abuses of dominance, although for simplicity in this paper we consider
only mergers and cartels, leaving abuse as the subject of ongoing work. There is a
total population of N such cases.
Figure 1: The population of cases
Deterred Undeterred
! (1  !)
Undetected Detected
(1  ) 
Although all these cases would be privately protable in the absence of competi-
tion policy, some do not occur because they are deterred by the existence of competi-
tion law and enforcement. The probability that a case is deterred, and therefore does
not occur, is given by !. For simplicity at this stage, we abstract from deterrence
of composition, i.e. where the parties choose to modify their behaviour in order to
avoid detection (for example, a cartel choosing to limit the scale of its overcharge, or
merger parties choosing to exclude some markets in which the merger may otherwise
8This counterfactual is over-simplication to the extent that private enforcement might anyway
deter some such cases. It also abstracts from the possibility that other policy, such as import
liberalisation or deregulation, might also deter behaviour.
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have an anti-competitive impact). We return to the composition e¤ect at the start
of section 4.
Within the undeterred subset, there are some cases that are discovered by the
CA, but others go undetected; the conditional probability that an undeterred case is
detected is . Since we have dened the population to include only anti-competitive
cases, any investigated, but cleared, case is excluded from the population. For the
moment, Type 1 and Type 2 errors are excluded from this framework, but these are
discussed below in section 7.
In general, both probabilities and N may be time variant and interdependent;
for example, higher detection probabilities may lead, ceteris paribus, to greater de-
terrence in the future. However, this is irrelevant for the purposes of the current
paper.
Since the probability that a potential case is not deterred and detected is (1 !),
the expected number of detected cases is:9
C = (1  !)N (1)
This leads to the straightforward observation that, at any given time, the number
of detected and the number of deterred cases are inversely related, although it should
be stressed that this observation merely refers to the inverse static tautological rela-
tion between C and !N in Eqn.(1).10 It ignores the possibility of a positive dynamic
causal relation running from  to !: success by the CA in detecting might deter rms
from attempting to contravene the law in the future. Nevertheless, it highlights an
important qualication which should always be remembered in evaluation a low
number of detected cases does not necessarily signal a lazy or inept CA, it might
also be consistent with an Authority which is particularly e¤ective in deterring.
Proposition 1 Detected cases are likely to be only a small proportion of the popu-
lation
9Throughout the paper, to avoid superuous notation, any expectation operators are omitted.
10This follows obviously because as deterrence increases, this leaves fewer cases as detectable.
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To substantiate this and provide a rough illustration, we return to the surveys
briey described in Section 1: suppose for every merger intervened, there are 5
others in the population deterred, and for every detected cartel, there are 5 others
deterred, but 5 others undetected. We assume that all anticompetitive mergers
above the compulsory notication requirement (which applies in most countries) are
detected, and that anticompetitive mergers below have trivial e¤ect. Table 1 backs
out estimates of the two parameters and C from these gures. This suggests that
smallin Proposition 1 is 9% and 17% for cartels and mergers respectively.
Table 1: A back of the envelope calibration
Cartels Mergers
Deterrence multiplier 5 5
Non-detection multiplier 5 0
! 0.45 0.83
 0.17 1
C=N 0.09 0.17
These gures show that previous works - based on detected cases only - focus on
a small segment of anticompetitive harm, the total population harm is likely to be
much larger. If detected cases are taken randomly from the population then this can
be derived by a simple multiplication.11 For example suppose the CA estimates the
aggregate consumer harm it has avoided by its interventions to be £ 100, then if the
sample is random, the magnitudes of these might be estimated by applying these
multipliers respectively to £ 100, i.e. £ 500 for both deterrence and non-detection for
cartels, and £ 500 for deterrence of anticompetitive mergers.12
However, the assumption of randomness is questionable, and underlying the rest
of this paper is the possibility that it is in fact implausible. Especially if some
11In our notation, the harm by deterred cases could be derived by using the multiplier !=[(1 
!)], and the harm from non-detected cases by multiplying observed harm by [(1 )(1 !)]=[(1 
!)] = (1  )=.
12The OFT discusses the potential use of the deterrence multiplier along these lines in its current
Positive Impact evaluation (2012).
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unobserved cases involve substantially higher than average harm, the magnitudes
of aggregate harms involved may be substantially higher than implied by the above
calculations.
Viewed in this way, the paper addresses a classic potential problem of selection
bias. While the context here is the evaluation of the impact of CAs, this question
has much wider implications for any empirical research in IO where conclusions are
drawn from databases based on those mergers and cartels intervened by CAs. For
example Connor and Bolotova (2006) found the average cartel overcharge to be be-
tween 31 and 49 per cent, and Boyer and Kotochoni (2011) later claim to derive a
less biasedestimate of around 13-17 per cent. But neither of these works acknowl-
edge the possibility that these detected cartels may be systematically di¤erent from
undetected cases. If the undetected subset is more likely to include higher overcharge
cases, then these estimates will undershoot the true average overcharge for the pop-
ulation of all cartels. For mergers, Crandall and Winston (2003) estimate the impact
of public merger interventions on price cost margins between 1984 and 1996 for 20
manufacturing industries, and argue that a merger challenge has a very small and
statistically non-signicant negative e¤ect on the price-cost margin. They conclude
that this is because the authorities are not successful in distinguishing bad from good
mergers. But, even if this is the case, this type of analysis ignores the fact that in
addition to the intervened mergers, there will be other anticompetitive mergers that
have been successfully deterred. An outright anticompetitive merger is unlikely to be
proposed in the rst place, therefore the true benecial impact of competition policy
may potentially far exceed the impact estimated from the selected set of intervened
mergers.
To investigate the likely nature of such selection bias, the next two sections draw
on previous literatures to suggest working assumptions about the nature of (i) the
population distribution of harm, and (ii) samples drawn from it, i.e. cases detected
and intervened by CAs.
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3 The population distribution
Denote the net harmful (price increasing or quality reducing) e¤ect of any anti-
competitive merger or cartel by the random variable h, with a density function f(h)
and nite mean: E(h) =
R1
0
hf(h)dh.
Proposition 2 h has a population size distribution which is positively skewed.
In justication, note rst that harm is the product of p, the price change (or
quality degradation) caused by the anticompetitive behaviour Q, the size of the
a¤ected market, and t the avoided duration of the anticompetitive e¤ect. In general,
Q, like most non-negative size variates will have some form of positively skewed
distribution; this seems intuitively likely given that CA impact evaluations are often
dominated quantitatively be a few high-prole very large markets (e.g. grocery
supermarkets, petrol, banking). The duration of the conduct t is also likely to
behave like any other duration variable, with a long right-skew. Numerous studies
on the duration of cartels support this assumption.13 p merits further discussion
for mergers and cartels separately.
Mergers In a market of N rms, the possible permutations of bilateral horizontal
mergers is: N(N 1)
2
. On a priori grounds, it is likely that the mergers involving the
largest rms are more likely to be harmful. This assumption is still embedded in most
authoritiesmerger guidelines, and a simple formalisation can be easily derived for
the Cournot model, albeit for a special case. Given linear demand, Davies and Lyons
(2007, p.127) show that the price rise following merger will be: PM = P1 P0
P0
= 1
N
s
"
,
where P1 and P0 are the post and pre-merger prices respectively, s is the pre-merger
market share of the acquired rm, " is the market demand elasticity and N is rm
numbers. Since the distribution of market share is typically positively skewed, so too
will be the potential price rise from merger. With di¤erentiated products this e¤ect
will be less pronounced to the extent that diversion ratios need not necessarily map
directly on to market shares.
13See for example Levenstein and Suslow (2011).
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Cartels In principle, the upper bound on the cartel mark-up (harm) is the full
monopoly price - the reciprocal of the demand elasticity. We have little hard evi-
dence on how market elasticities are distributed across industries, but assuming, as a
default, a uniform distribution, then its reciprocal would take some sort of positively
skewed distribution. While the incentive compatible cartel price will rarely reach this
upper bound, and the counterfactual price (what would happen absent the cartel) is
rarely marginal cost pricing, unless the di¤erence between upper bound and actual
price is systematically and strongly negatively related to the elasticity, the actual
overcharge will also follow a positively skewed distribution.14
4 Sample selection
This section examines what can be inferred from previous literatures about how the
probability of selection (non-deterrence and detection) varies with case-harm, i.e.
how (1   !) and , vary with h. It surveys some models in the existing theoretical
literatures on cartels and mergers to draw out their implications for how deterrence
and detection may vary according to how harmful a case is. Key inferences from
these literatures are presented and discussed.
To avoid any illusion of spurious precision, we choose not to impose too much
structure on the inferences we make. Therefore we merely adopt a stylised tri-
chotomy, in which the population is broken down into three segments, low, medium
and high harm cases (hL, hM , and hH) - leaving open more precise delineation of
these categories for later research. Thus the purpose is to draw inferences about how
detection and deterrence rates, M;CL , 
M;C
M , 
M;C
H and !
M;C
L , !
M;C
M , !
M;C
H
15 might
di¤er between the three segments, for cartels and mergers respectively. Although
crude, this trichotomy allows for the possibility of non-monotonicity and is also car-
ried forward into the calibration section below.
14It might be noted that most meta-analyses of cartel overcharge (e.g Connor and Bolotova,
2006) report positively skewed distributions, but this is inconclusive for our purposes since such
studies are heavily biased towards cartels detected under prohibition regimes.
15To avoid notation overload, the M (mergers) and C (cartels) superscripts are omitted hereafter.
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As a preliminary, we rst return to the issue of composition deterrence mentioned
earlier. We now allow that, for any given merger or cartel, there is a potentially large
number of forms and therefore harms (h), it might take. For example two rms may
merge their activities in di¤erent ways, depending on how much overlap they want to
create; and cartels may decide between di¤erent collusive prices. For each case there
is then a continuous distribution of potential harm, and the choice that rms make
depends on their assessment of the probability of detection. When the prospect of
enforcement deters a cartel altogether, then a larger proportion of h is deterred than
when the cartel merely decides to coordinate on a lower price to lessen the chance
of detection.16 Similarly, some mergers may be deterred in any form, while others
are still consummated, albeit with divestments of overlapping assets o¤ered. In this
way both frequency and composition deterrence are consistent with our analysis.
4.1 Cartels
Anti-cartel enforcement has two arms: ex o¢ cio detection and leniency applications,
and previous literature has implications for how each impacts on deterrence and
detection.
4.1.1 Detection
Inference 1a (leniency): The probability of detection declines with case harm.
This draws from both the theoretical and experimental literatures, such as Chang
and Harrington (2012) and Bigoni et al. (2012), which suggest that less stable cartels
are more likely to apply for leniency. Leniency applications are therefore strongly
linked with the incentive compatibility of the cartel, and often only made once the
cartel breaks down. As our population is dened to include only privately protable
cartels (incentive compatible if there were no enforcement) this implies that more
protable cartels are less likely to break down when reduction of nes is o¤ered under
16See for example Block et al. (1981), where the threat of detection does not necessarily dissuade
the cartel from forming, but may persuade it to reduce the markup.
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leniency. This is formally proven in the Appendix (A.1.1) applying the framework
used by Motta and Polo (2003).
Inference 1b (ex-o¢ cio detection): There are no strong reasons for
expecting ex-o¢ cio detection to vary with case harm.
Our reading of the literature suggests that there are no convincing arguments
for rejecting the hypothesis that the probability of ex-o¢ cio detection is invariant
with respect to the magnitude of case harm. This is contrary to Block et al. (1981),
who assume that the detection probability increases with the size of markup because
higher prices are more likely to be spotted by customers or the CA. However, neither
the empirical and experimental evidence o¤ers any support for this assumption.17
Rather, there is a growing understanding that it is high price changes, rather than
levels, that create suspicions in the minds of customers and the CA.18
Inference 1c: The probability of detection by leniency is greater than the
probability of ex-o¢ cio detection.
There is widespread evidence that in countries with leniency programmes the
proportion of leniency cases far exceeds the proportion of ex o¢ cio cases; in the EU
the ratio is approximately 2.
If these inferences are correct, then it follows that the aggregate probability of
detection, the weighted average of the leniency and ex-o¢ cio detections, must decline
with case harm:
Inference 1 L > M > H
Note that this would be robust to a weak tendency for ex-o¢ cio detection to
increase with harm.
17Bigoni et al. (2012).
18Harrington (2005) and Harrington (2004).
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4.1.2 Deterrence
Conventionally the literature assumes that rational prot-maximising rms will only
form a cartel if the expected payo¤ exceeds the payo¤s from competing/deviating
after allowing for the probability of detection and regulatory sanctions. It follows
that, if the expected ne is invariant to the amount of harm, or has a signicant xed
component, cartels with su¢ ciently small price raising e¤ects are more likely to be
deterred. For instance, Chang and Harrington (2009) denes a marginal industry, in
which rms are indi¤erent between collusion and competition (given a competition
authority), and a toughening of policy raises the critical level dening the marginal
industry, and the probability of deterrence increases. This is conrmed empirically
by the earlier mentioned NMa survey, which reports that increasing expected nes
would result in a larger proportion of deterred cases.
More formally, there are many theoretical models that analyse how the incen-
tive compatibility of cartels changes given CA enforcement. Some of these, Motta
and Polo (2003), Chang and Harrington (2009), Harrington (2004 and 2005) are
summarised in the Appendix. They lead us to:
Inference 2 !L > !M > !H
Note that in models that do not allow leniency and assume that the probability
of detection increases with harm, the results would be the contrary, see for example
Block et al. (1981) or Houba et al. (2012) in which cartels with larger harm are less
IC. However, given the prominence of leniency in anti-cartel enforcement and the
absence of evidence for the assumption that higher harm cartels are more likely to
be detected, we prefer not to follow this route.
4.2 Mergers
4.2.1 Detection
Inference 3 All anticompetitive mergers are detected ( = 1)
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In most jurisdictions, notication of all proposed mergers above some threshold
is compulsory, in which case, literal non-detection is conned to the lower tail of the
h distribution. An exception is the UK, but even there it is unlikely that any large
merger would go unnoticed by the OFT.
4.2.2 Deterrence
Assuming that the harm caused by the merger is directly proportional to its prof-
itability, Barros et al. (2010) argue that a merger will be deterred if (a) it is too
restrictive (i.e. mergers in the upper tail), or (b) the expected payo¤does not exceed
the cost of the merger approval (mergers in the lower tail). Regarding (a) assume
that in the absence of merger control all privately protable mergers take place. In
this case one would observe that markets would merge to monopoly. However, this is
not the case, and this is presumably because rms rarely propose mergers which are
clearly anti-competitive because they anticipate that they are likely to be prohibited
by the CA. Many theoretical papers follow this intuition. For example Barros et al.
(2010), Seldeslachts et al. (2009) and Garrod and Lyons (2011) all assume that a
CA prohibits mergers with harmful e¤ects above a CAs reservation point, h > h
(where h depends on the rigour of merger control ). Merger guidelines send out
clear messages to rms on the types of cases where a merger is likely to be found
anticompetitive (e.g. in the EC mergers with HHI > 2000). Therefore highly anti-
competitive mergers are less likely to be proposed as they carry a very high chance
of prohibition.
The NMa (2011) survey described above investigated rmsreactions to both (a)
and (b) in The Netherlands, and found that an increase in merger administration fees
increased deterrence. Also, while the rms themselves were less inclined to abort
plans for mergers with higher joint market shares, their legal advisors advised to the
contrary higher market shares would be interpreted by the CA as more likely to
be considered anti-competitive and less likely to be cleared.
This leads to Inference 4. Formal proof is also provided in A.2.2 of Appendix A.
Inference 4 !L > !M < !H
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Table 2 summarises the inferences of this section. It shows that selection (non-
deterrence or detection) is unlikely to be random over the harm caused by a cartel
or anticompetitive merger. Also there is a strong chance that by looking at detected
cases we may ignore those cases where potentially most anticompetitive harm lies.
Table 2: Deterrence and detection probabilities
Cartel Merger
Deterrence !L > !M > !H !L > !M < !H
Detection L > M > H L = M = H = 1
5 Selection bias with di¤erential sampling
Against this backcloth, this section considers a simple sampling problem in which the
purpose is to estimate the magnitude of total harm for a population which comprises
three segments, each of which is sampled randomly, but with di¤erent sampling
proportions. It shows that, in these circumstances, the "simple multiplier estimate"
- of the type described above in section 2, in which the magnitude of aggregate sample
harm is multiplied by the inverse of the proportionate sample size - is typically biased.
It establishes what other information is needed to provide an unbiased estimate. This
provides the methodology for the next section in which the magnitudes of deterred
and undetected harm are simulated under alternative scenarios based on the above
inferences.
5.1 Notation
A population comprises three, not necessarily equal, segments (L;M;H), ordered
by the size of anticompetitive harm. The lower tail of least harmful cases accounts
for a proportion PL of the population, and proportion HL of population harm; the
upper tail for PH and HH , and the middle segment for PM = (1   PH  PL) and
HM = (1 HH  HL), respectively.
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Each segment is sampled randomly, but with di¤erent sample proportions i
(i = L;M;H): For notational convenience, write L = LM and H = HM .19
The parameters L and H will be referred to as the sampling di¤erentials and are
employed in the next section to capture di¤erent scenarios about di¤erentials in
deterrence and detection rates between the three segments.
Suppose that the aggregate proportionate sample size,  =
X
i
iPi, and mag-
nitude of sample harm, Hs, are both known. Denoting the magnitude of population
harm by H, then the "simple multiplier estimate", Hs=; is an unbiased estimator
of H; if the sample is random overall.20. However, in this case, it is unlikely that the
sample will be random.
In the above notation:
  LPL + MPM + HPH  M [1  (1  L)PL   (1  H)PH ] and (2)
Hs=H  LHL + MHM + HHH  M [1  (1  L)HL   (1  H)HH ] (3)
Thus
Hs=H  + M [(1  L)(PL  HL) + (1  H)(PH  HH)] (4)
where M =  f1  (1  L)PL   (1  H)PHg 1
19Thus we approximate continuous relationships between the sampling rate and case harm with
a simple three-step function, in which the magnitudes of the  are sensitive to how broadly dened
are the sizes of the di¤erent segments (Pi). Although analytically crude, this device is nevertheless
su¢ ciently exible for present purposes - the relative magnitudes of the  can capture monotonicity
or not, and concavity, linearity or convexity in the relationship between sampling and harm.
20In conventional notation, for a sample n with sample mean x, drawn from a population N
with mean , the magnitudes of sample and population harms are nx and N respectively. If the
sample is random, E(x) = , the ratio of the magnitude of sample harm to proportionate sample
size has E(nx)=(n=N) = N:
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Thus
H =
Hs
+ M [(1  L)(PL  HL) + (1  H)(PH  HH)] (5)
Proposition 3 With random sampling across the three segments (L = H = 1),
the "simple multiplier" Hs= is an unbiased estimator of aggregate population harm.
With di¤erential sampling across segments, the estimator will be typically biased, and
the direction and magnitude of bias will depend on (i) the sampling di¤erentials and
(ii) the relative sizes of mass in the two tails of the population:
Hs= R H as (1  L)(PL  HL) R (1  H)(HH   PH) (6)
The impact of the sampling di¤erentials is obvious and intuitive: for a given
population (described by PL; HL; PH and HH), upward bias is more likely the larger
is sampling of the upper tail (H) relative to sampling of the lower tail (L). Intuition
on (PL; HL; PH and HH); is less clear and Figure 2 introduces a traditional Lorenz
curve to aid interpretation. Recall that, if a population is ranked in ascending order
of size (here, harm) along the horizontal axis, the Lorenz curve shows the proportion
of aggregate harm accounted for by those cases: i.e. how the proportion of the harm
accounted for by the proportion of least harmful cases x increases with x21. Both
axes are therefore normalised to the range, zero to 1, the 45 degree diagonal provides
the symmetric benchmark where all cases involve identical harm. The curve, which
must be concave to the diagonal because cases are ranked in ascending order of size,
lies further below the diagonal the more asymmetric is the harm size distribution.
Noting that, in the Figure, (PL   HL) = AD and (HH   PH) = BC, it follows
that
Hs= R H as AD=BC R (1  H)=(1  L) (7)
21The Lorenz curve often proves helpful in the analysis of positively skewed distributions. Tra-
ditionally, sizemight be personal income in studies of income distribution or rm size in studies
of industrial concentration; see Lorenz (1905), or Gastwirth (1972).
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Figure 2: The Lorenz curve with three segments of population and harm
The magnitudes of AD and BC depend on the relative sizes of the tails and the
degree of population asymmetry, represented by the distance of the Lorenz curve
from the diagonal, but the direction of bias also depends on the precise shape of the
Lorenz curve, and therefore the form of the underlying population distribution. A
specic paramaterisation of the Lorenz curve proves to be very convenient for present
purposes.
5.2 The symmetric Lorenz curve (lognormal distribution)
If the Lorenz curve is symmetric either side of a downward sloping main diagonal,
then, for any sized lower tail PL accounting for harm HL; there is an upper tail of
size PH = HL which accounts for harm of size HH = PL, e.g. if the 30% lowest harm
cases account for 10% of total harm, then the 10% most harmful cases will account
for 30% of harm. This leads to:
Proposition 4 If the Lorenz curve is symmetric, the simple multiplier will produce
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upward (downward) biased estimates of population harm if the upper tail is more
(less) heavily sampled than the lower tail; and, for a given total sample size, the
magnitude of bias will be greater the more asymmetric is the population size distrib-
ution.
Proof. For a symmetric Lorenz curve, AD = BC; i.e. (PL HL) = (HH   PH) and
(15) simplies to:
H =
Hs=
1 + (H   L)(PL  HL)(M=) (8)
and Hs= R H as H R L, and for given (H   L), it is absolutely increasing in
asymmetry, (PL  HL).
Lorenz-symmetry is clearly analytically convenient here, but two points should be
noted. First, it requires that we dene the tails in a relative way: the size of the upper
tail is dened by the size of the lower tail (in the sense that PH = HL). However, this
is less arbitrary than it might appear, since the trichotomous segmentation is itself
only an approximation to capture, in a simple way, underlying continuous, but not
necessarily monotonic, relationships between ! and  and harm. In that sense, there
are no truedenitions of the lower and upper tails; although, for a given underlying
relationship, di¤erent delineations of the tails clearly imply di¤erent values for the
.
Second, and more generally, most size distributions need not generate symmetric
Lorenz curves. However, there is at least one distribution which does: the lognormal
(Aitchison and Brown, 1957, p.113). Since this has a strong pedigree and is found to
be widely applicable, at least as a rst approximation, to many real world business
size-related distributions - we employ this as our base assumption in the calibrations
below.
As a sensitivity test we also use Paretos curve - another equally plausible posi-
tively skewed distribution but which does not necessarily generate symmetric Lorenz
curves (see Appendix 2).
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6 Estimating deterred and undetected harm
This section applies Eqn.(5) to simulate the magnitudes of undetected and deterred
harms, assuming that estimates are available for (i) the proportionate sample size
();which is derived from extraneous estimates of ! and , available from surveys
such as those discussed in Section 2 , and (ii) the magnitude of sample harm detected
and rectied by a CA (Hs), as reported in its annual impact evaluation. This is
illustrated by using the European Commissions (EC) own estimates of remedied
harm, and calibrating with parameter values in line with the expectations derived
earlier in Table 2.
6.1 Notation and methodology
The purpose is to estimate population harm from detected harm (i.e. sample harm
above). Denoting by HUDT ; HDR; HUDR the undetected, deterred and undeterred
harms respectively, then aggregate population harm H is related to detected harm
HDT = Hs by:
H  HUDT +HDT +HDR (9)
Note that each is dened as absolute magnitudes, rather than the proportions
denoted previously by HL; HM and HH .
We proceed in three stages. Eqn.(5) is rst applied to estimate total population
harm and second to estimate undeterred harm. Then, deterred and undetected harms
can be backed out as residuals from Eqn.(5).
Stage 1: estimating total population harm (H)
If population harm in Eqn.(5) is dened as the harm of all potential anticompet-
itive cases, and sample harm is detected harm, HDT , then the proportionate sample
size is  = (1 !). The di¤erential sampling proportions each have two constituents
- di¤erentials in the undeterred and detection rates:
L = 
UDR
L 
DT
L and H = 
UDR
H 
DT
H
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where UDRL =
(1  !L)
(1  !M) , 
UDR
H =
(1  !H)
(1  !M) , 
DT
L =
L
M
, DTH =
H
M
Stage 2: estimating undeterred harm (HUDR)
If the population is now re-dened to refer only to all undeterred cases, then H
is replaced in Eqn.(5) by aggregate undeterred harm HUDR and the sample harm is
again HDT ; but detected cases are now a sample of proportionate size  = . In this
case, the  refer only to di¤erentials in detection rates between the low and medium,
DTL , and medium and high segments, 
DT
H .
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Stage 3: estimating deterred and undetected harms
Deterred harm can now be calculated as the residual (H HUDR), and undetected
harm as the residual (HUDR  HDT ).
6.2 Calibration: an illustrative case study
This is illustrated by employing estimates from the EC of the magnitudes of harm
it publishes as avoided/rectied from of its cartel and merger interventions in 2010:
HDT= 7.2 and 5.0 billion EUR respectively. The EC explains that these estimates
are based on very conservative estimates. For values of  and (1   !) we use those
derived earlier in Table 1.
If these samples were random, then total potential population harm would be
H = HDT=[(1   !)]:For comparative purposes these are shown for cartels and
mergers in Table 3 as the HS=: 79 and 30 billion EUR respectively. These are
disaggregated into deterred, accounting for 36 and 25 billion EUR, and undetected,
accounting for 36 billion and 0 respectively.
Assumptions for calibrated parameters In order to simulate using Eqn.(5),
calibrations are needed for the ; PL and HL.
(i) Asymmetry of population distribution (PL and HL.)
22Given that the populationis now conned to only the undeterred cases, the segment propor-
tions (Pi) now refer to the proportions of undeterred cases ((1  !i)Pi).
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For a symmetric Lorenz curve, the extent of asymmetry in the population is
reected by the mass in the lower tail - more precisely, the di¤erence between the
proportion of cases and proportion of harm it accounts for. As base values, these
are set at 0.4 and 0.05: for a lognormal distribution, this corresponds to a standard
deviation of log harm of approximately 1.3923, which is a fairly typical estimate from
previous empirical rm size studies (see for example Cabral and Mata (2003), and
is appropriate if the size of infringing rms is a main driver of h). Two alternatives
to this base case are also considered: the more symmetric (PL = 0:4 and HL = 0:1)
and less symmetric (PL = 0:5 and HL = 0:05); corresponding to standard deviations
of log harm of 1 and 1.645 respectively.
(ii) Sampling di¤erentials ()
The calibrations here are based on the expectations summarised earlier in Table
2. For cartels, in the base case, the probabilities of both deterrence and detection
both decline monotonically with harm - but at a declining rate for detection, which
reects the expectation that detection via leniency is considerably more likely for low
harm cartels than for medium and high harm cartels. As alternative, we also consider
(i) a linear decline in detection between the three segments, and (ii) constancy of the
deterrence rate across the segments. For mergers, a U-shaped deterrence probability
is assumed, being highest for the low and high harm tails. Detection is assumed to
be certain.
To aid interpretation, Table 3 also reports the segment values of ! and  implied
by each pair of hypothesesised  values.24
6.2.1 Results (i) Symmetric Lorenz curves (lognormal)
Table 3 reports calculated population harm, in aggregate and then disaggregated into
undetected and deterred harms, for each scenario. Di¤erent scenarios are presented
23A lognormal variate, mean  and variance 2, generates a rst moment distribution which is
also a lognormal, with mean  + 2 and variance 2, see Aitchison and Brown (1957). It follows
that z(PL) = z(HL) + , when z denotes the standard normal transformation.
24Note that the range of permissible  values are constrained by the necessity for all segment !
and  to lie in the range 0 to 1.
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in each column and the nal columns report what total population harm would have
been using the biasedmultiplier HS=.
Table 3: Simulated results for symmetric Lorenz curve
CARTELS MERGERS
(!=0.45, =0.17) (!=0.83, =1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Hs/ (7) (8) (9) Hs/
Magnitude of harm
Population 149 181 94 79 133 172 79 41 39 47 29
Detected 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 5 5 5 5
Deterred 52 82 43 28 49 54 36 36 34 42 24
Undetected 89 92 44 44 77 110 36 0 0 0 0
Deterred pro-competitive mergers 1.73 3.29 1.96
Parameters
PL 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.5
HL 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.1 0.05 0.05 0.1 0.05
DRL 0.75 1 1 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.8 0.8 0.8
DRH 1.25 1 1 1.25 1.25 1.25 0.1 0.1 0.1
DTL 4 4 1.25 1.25 4 4 1 1 1
RRL 0.5 0.5 0.75 0.75 0.5 0.5 1 1 1
Implied parameters
!L 0.55 0.45 0.45 0.55 0.56 0.54 0.84 0.84 0.84
!M 0.40 0.45 0.45 0.40 0.41 0.39 0.81 0.81 0.80
!H 0.25 0.45 0.45 0.25 0.26 0.23 0.98 0.98 0.98
L 0.34 0.31 0.19 0.20 0.35 0.30 1.00 1.00 1.00
M 0.09 0.08 0.15 0.16 0.09 0.07 1.00 1.00 1.00
H 0.04 0.04 0.11 0.12 0.04 0.04 1.00 1.00 1.00
Cartels Under scenario 1, the preferred base case, total potential population harm
is estimated to be nearly double that derived from applying simple (biased) multipli-
ers, and this di¤erence comes from the estimate that undetected cases generate much
larger anticompetitive harm. This total is even more pronounced when (scenario 2 )
deterrence is assumed to be invariant with respect to harm; i.e. the probability of
deterrence in higher harm cases is larger than in the rst scenario. In this case, the
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di¤erence between undetected and undeterred harms narrows signicantly but is not
removed. The two are more or less in balance when (scenario 3 ) the detection rate is
less sensitive to case harm, but even here aggregate harm remains higher than implied
by the simple multiplier. Scenario 4 is included largely for pedagogic reasons - in this
case deterrence increases and detection fall identically with case harm, and the net
e¤ect is that total population harm is exactly as predicted by the simple multiplier.
Scenarios 5 and 6 return to the base case, but now posit, respectively, less and more
asymmetry in the population distribution. Predictably, total population harm is
much higher, especially the undetected part, than under simple multipliers, but even
with a relatively symmetric population distribution (scenario 5 ) this is substantially
greater than with simple multipliers.
Inevitably, numerical simulations of this type, based on what is at best informed
guess work, should not be taken literally. However, some qualitative conclusions
seem fairly robust across scenarios, and these all derive from not unreasonable un-
derlying assumptions that (i) the population distribution of cartel harm is positively
skewed and (ii) that more harmful cartels are at least weakly less likely to be de-
terred or detected - put simply: very protable (harmful) cartels are less likely to
be deterred by policy, and insofar as they are more stable and less vulnerable to
leniency programmes, also likely to avoid getting caught.
Result 1 The potential harm from cartels in an economy may be noticeably
greater than usually supposed. Simple multipliers, based on estimates of how many
cartels are undetected or deterred may underestimate this potential by as much as
50%. A signicant part of this potential harm never actually happens, because it is
deterred, and this is a positive nding for CAs. On the other hand, deterred harm is
typically outweighed by the magnitude of undetected harm - at least in the scenarios
considered here. In that very particular sense, the net balance for CAs is negative.
This result is qualitatively robust with respect to the degree of population asymmetry,
and the extent to which deterrence and detection vary with respect to harm.
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Mergers For mergers, we consider fewer scenarios because it is assumed that de-
tection is certain and that the overall deterrence rate is high (5 out of 6 mergers are
deterred), and this reduces the scope for signicant di¤erences related to harm.25 In
the preferred base case (scenario 7), deterred harm is nearly 50% higher than under
simple multipliers. This derives from the assumption that virtually all highly harmful
mergers are deterred, and this is not o¤set by a greater tendency for low harm cases
to be deterred than medium harm. The two other scenarios (scenarios 8 and 9),
which vary the degree of population asymmetry reveal that, as might be expected,
this result is accentuated the greater is the degree of population asymmetry.
Result 2 The deterrence of anti-competitive mergers has an impact that is
typically much larger than has previously been supposed - for example, as implied by
simple multipliers.
The intuition is fairly obvious if we pose the question: how often do mergers
to monopoly occur, despite the fact that these would be potentially very protable?
Under our plausible assumptions, such mergers rarely occur because they are deterred
by an e¤ective, and well-recognised framework of competition policy and related
institutions. This will be true to a greater or lesser extent no matter how asymmetric
is the underlying population distribution of potential mergers. The e¤ects from
deterring pro-competitive mergers are discussed in Section 7.
6.2.2 Results (ii) Non-symmetric Lorenz curves (Pareto)
Although these two results are conditional on symmetric Lorenz curves, the assump-
tion is driven largely by presentational convenience and is easily relaxed. In further
simulations we have used Paretos curve as an alternative. Like the lognormal, this
comes with a strong pedigree from previous literatures of size distributions, but un-
like the lognormal, does not necessarily imply Lorenz-symmetry.
25An important di¤erence between mergers and cartels is that, while many cartels may go un-
detected, for those that are detected, the CAs decision is typically correct. For mergers, while
detection is less of an issue, incorrect decisions are more likely. This is pursued in the next section.
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However, a drawback of Paretos curve is that it is typically found to provide in-
accurate ts for the lower tails of most real world positively skewed size distributions.
We therefore assume that it describes only that part of the distribution above some
critical value, h0, which lies somewhere within our lower tail. In other words, harm
is distributed in the medium segment and the upper tail by Paretos curve. We need
not make any assumption about how harm is distributed within the lower tail, but
for comparability with the base line scenarios in Table 3, it is assumed that the lower
tail accounts for 40% of the population and 5% of the harm. The remaining 60%
of the population, accounting for 95% of the harm, follows Paretos curve. Again
as in the base case above, the upper tail accounts for 5% of the population, but its
share of harm is not constrained to be 40%, but is simulated according to Paretos
curve. Appendix B derives the relationship between HH and PH for the upper tail
of a Pareto curve. Using these gures the harm in the upper segment is given by:
HH = 0:95(0:05=(0:6))
( 1)= (10)
As can be seen, HH now varies with the value of Paretos inverse inequality
parameter :Table 4 calibrates for three alternative values of  = 1:1, and 2, denoting
respectively very asymmetric and a more symmetric distribution. A third alternative,
 = 1:54; is also shown because this generates HH = 0:4, i.e. Lorenz-symmetry. In
this case, the Pareto and lognormal simulations are identical, but with  = 1:1, there
is a relatively greater mass, and  = 2 a relatively smaller mass, in the upper tail
than with Lorenz-symmetry.
Comparing Tables 3 and 4, the base case simulations with Lorenz-symmetry gen-
erated total harms of 148 and 42 for cartels and mergers respectively, but now, when
the mass in the upper tail is greater than under Lorenz-symmetry, these rise sharply
to 214 and 85 respectively; while, when the mass in the upper tail is smaller than
under Lorenz-symmetry, the harms fall, if less sharply, to 124 and 35. Disaggregat-
ing, undetected harm is the main driver of these di¤erences for cartels, but deterred
harm is for mergers.
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Table 4: Magnitude of harm if harm has Pareto distribution
CARTELS MERGERS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
 2 1.54 1.1 2 1.54 1.1
Detected 7 7 7 5 5 5
Deterred 46 52 63 30 37 80
Undetected 71 89 143 0 0 0
Population 124 148 214 35 42 85
Deterred pro-competitive mergers 1.50 1.76 3.61
7 Type 1 and 2 errors on mergers
So far it has been assumed that the CA does not make mistakes, by either incorrectly
deterring or intervening in pro-competitive cases (Type 1), or by failing to deter or
intervene in welfare-reducing cases (Type 2). This section shows how these errors
can be incorporated in the framework and quantied within the methodology.
For deterrence, the only new issue is Type 1 errors for mergers. Type 2 errors
are already represented in the framework as the undeterred harmful cartels/mergers.
Type 1 deterrence errors cannot occur for cartels if one assumes that benecial cartels
can never occur. But the possibility of business chilling cannot be ignored, i.e. where
pro-competitive mergers are deterred (Type 1). It might be argued that the quanti-
tative impact is unlikely to be important. For example, the Deloitte (2007) survey
reports that respondents generally perceived this as rarely, if ever, occurring, and
Baker (2003) also argues that business chilling is minimal in practice. He draws this
conclusion from a survey of the limited empirical research literature which evaluates
ex-post the impact of mergers on e¢ ciency, and concludes that mergers typically fail
to achieve the e¢ ciency gains rms anticipate or claim ex-ante. In our opinion this
is an extravagant claim, implying that there is no such thing as a pro-competitive
merger. Our approach is more cautious and poses the question what is the max-
imum, or upper bound, on the magnitude of business chilling? As argued earlier,
one important source of deterrence is the costs the rm anticipates it would incur
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if it engages with merger control (administrative, legal etc). Where these costs ex-
ceed its private benets, the merger will not be proposed. But this will be equally
true whatever the source of the benets - whether enhanced e¢ ciency or increased
market power - so long as engagement costs of approval are the the same for pro-
and anti-competitive mergers.26 If so, an upper bound on the benets lost from pro-
competitive mergers deterred will be the magnitude of deterred harm in the relatively
less protable harmful mergers in the lower segment of our framework.27 In terms of
our methodology, this can be quantied as the magnitude of lower tail harm, !LHL;
which is easily recovered from the estimated harms in Tables 3 and 4: as reported in
the last row of harms in the tables, namely EUR 1.5-3.6bn for the illustrative case
study. These magnitudes are not at all trivial since they represent between 30% and
70% of the benets claimed by the CA for its detected cases. However, they do not
materially alter the two main results of the previous section.
For intervention, again this can be largely discounted for cartels. Type 1 is
impossible assuming all cartels are anticompetitive per se, and Type 2 would imply
that the CA does not prosecute a cartel of which it is aware28. For mergers the
potential for both types of error cannot be excluded. Conceptually, Type 2 can
be incorporated quite easily by introducing a further conditional probability into
Eqn(1). Dene  as the conditional probability that a case is intervened, given that
it is undeterred and detected. Then, the number of intervened cases is:
C = (1  !)N (11)
Thus 1    is the probability of Type 2 error, and in order to simulate how this
impacts on the above estimates, we would need to know its aggregate magnitude
26In fact this assumption is overly cautious if the rm anticipates that an anti-competitive
proposal would probably require higher legal costs and a longer investigation stage than one which
was based on highly plausible anticipated e¢ ciency gains. To the extent that this is true, our
approach is consistent with an upper bound.
27This assumes that mergers with anticipated e¢ ciency gains which are so great as to exceed
anticipated costs are never deterred.
28Strictly speaking, there may be cases where a CA does not intervene because it judges that
the evidence is not su¢ ciently strong to rebut any appeal. In our framework, such cases would be
included in the estimates of undetected harm.
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and how it varies with case harm. We do not have such information, and this is
a subject for future research. But to give an approximate idea of the magnitudes
which might be involved, assume that the overall rate of Type 2 errors is relatively
low ( = 0:9) and invariant with case harm. Observed sample harm, as recorded by
the CA (5.0 in Table 3) should now be interpreted as the magnitude of intervened
detected harm. However, the true harm of detected cases is 5:0=0:9 = 5:6, of
which the CA fails to recognise 0.6 due to Type 2 error. This should be subtracted
from the previous estimates of deterred harm in Tables 3 and 4. Of course, the
correction would be larger (smaller) if Type 2 errors are more likely for high (low)
harm mergers. Turning to possible Type I errors, these would be cases where the
CA has intervened and has calculated an estimate of harm detected, and therefore
avoided. If, on the contrary, there is no net harm, then the starting estimates of
detected harm are biased upwards and in our methodology, aggregate undetected
and undeterred harms, which are derived as multiples of detected harm, will also be
upward biased by the same proportion. Having said this, as already mentioned, CA
estimates of positive impact are always based on very conservative estimates, and
it is our view that the main source of Type 1 errors lies in deterrence, as discussed
above, and further work should give this the top priority.
8 Concluding remarks
Phenomena following the Pareto principle - or its special case, the so called 80-20 rule
- impact on every aspect of our lives. Very often a small proportion of causes (e.g. 20
per cent of cases) generate a very large proportion of e¤ects (e.g. 80 per cent of the
e¤ects). For example the largest few websites generate the vast majority advertising
income on the internet, or the largest few customers generate most revenues for
businesses. In these cases the need to focus on the few cases that lead to most e¤ect
is well understood. We have shown above that very likely the same should be true
when assessing competition policy. The largest harm cases may account for most of
the anticompetitive harm, yet often no special attention is directed towards these
cases.
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The introduction raised two ambitious questions. Subject to some very important
caveats, the above calibrations provide some very rough answers. First, how much
potential harm is out there in an economy? Pooling the simulations of Tables
3 and 4 if the CA detects (and removes) 7.2 billion of harm with its anti-cartel
activities, simulated total potential population harm lies in the range 79 and 214
billion euros; and for anti-competitive mergers, detected cases of 5 billion suggest a
population harm ranging from 30 to 85 billion euros. Second, how successful is the CA
at combating this harm? Judged in these terms, success is the sum of detected and
deterred harms, which ranges from 43-89 billion euros for cartels, and for mergers, by
assumption, all potential harm is either detected or deterred.29 In other words, the
aggregate potential for anti-competitive harm dwarfs what is detected and recorded
by a CA, by a magnitude of between 10 and 30 times for cartels and 6 to 17 for
mergers; and very approximately, half of the cartel harm and all of the merger
harm is combatted by the CA. The lower bounds in these ranges apply if observed
(detected) cases are a random sample of the population, while the upper bounds give
an indication of just how considerable selection bias might be in this context.
However, the caveats should not be understated. At best, these are a rst stab at
answering these ambitious questions, presented merely to illustrate what is possible.
They are clearly sensitive to the assumptions and particular numerical calibrations
of what is, at this stage, a highly stylised and simplied framework. The magnitudes
of all estimates are dependent on the starting point values of sample detected harm
and simple detection and deterrence rates. The latter in particular are speculative,
being derived from largely survey interview data. The estimates of detected harm
produced by CAs are typically derived using very conservative assumptions in order
to avoid accusations of self-justication. This cautions against attaching over-reliance
on the absolute magnitudes of our estimates, although the main qualitative results
would be robust to using alternative plausible estimates.
A more conceptual limitation to the methodology is that it abstracts from Type
1 or Type 2 errors by the CA. While, in principle, Type 2 errors can be incorporated
fairly easily as shown in Section 7, little is known about the precise magnitudes
29Alternatively, some failureoccurs to the extent that the CA makes Type 2 errors.
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involved. The possibility of a perverse deterrent e¤ect (Type 1) for welfare enhancing
mergers is more problematic. This falls outside the framework because the population
is dened to include only anti-competitive mergers, but this clearly merits further
research.
However, and putting to one side these very real issues, the primary intended
contribution of this paper lies not in the results of the calibrations, but is more
methodological. It asks what sort of information would be needed to quantify the
unknowns. In has highlighted two key building blocks. The rst is a better under-
standing of the nature of the population distribution of harm. While the assumption
of some form of positively skewed distribution seems highly likely, and the precise
nature of the distribution (here lognormal versus Pareto) is probably of second-order
importance, our choice of parameter values has been necessarily largely arbitrary.
The second is the question of how the rates of detection and deterrence (and in-
tervention) vary with case harm. Here, existing theory provides some leads about a
priori expectations, but these are largely unsubstantiated empirically, and at this
stage have been modelled using a simplied trichotomy between low, medium and
high harm cases.
This provides some obvious priorities for future research. Empirically, further
work is required to replace some fairly arbitrary calibrations and assumptions with
defensible estimates. For example, for cartels, insights into the di¤erences between the
population and samples may be revealed by careful comparison of existing historical
cartel databases which include cases drawn from di¤erent regimes, under some of
which cartels were legal while in others they were illegal. Also laboratory experiments
which explore how deterrence, derived from nes under leniency, varies with case
harm could also be informative. For mergers, a better understanding of the potential
population might be gained from a meta-analysis of the previous empirical literatures
on the price raising e¤ects of mergers. This may help identify the critical rate of
cartel price increase which typically activates CA intervention, and how active merger
enforcement a¤ects the distribution. Existing research (as discussed in section 1)
already provides some empirical insights into the magnitudes of deterrence, measured
simply in terms of numbers of mergers, but further work might focus more on whether
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deterrence impacts di¤erentially on di¤erent merger types (delineated for example by
unilateral versus coordinated e¤ects, and by the market shares of merging parties).
Finally, the present paper has been conned to mergers and cartels, and future work
will examine how far the proposed methodology might also be applied to cases of
monopoly abuse - where, arguably, the possibilities of Types 1 and 2 errors are even
more pronounced.
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A Literature review to Section 4
A.1 Cartels
A.1.1 Motta and Polo (2003)
Detection Motta and Polo (2003) assume perfectly symmetric rms with three
possible strategies: not collude (NC), collude and reveal (CR) and collude and not
reveal (CNR). They derive ICs which establish which strategies rms choose given
a CA with leniency programme. These are directly relevant for our purposes as
this allows a comparison of the CR and the CNR equilibria and therefore provides
an insight into how the probability of detection by leniency varies with cartel harm.
They show that CNR dominates CR if the probability of prosecution (p) is su¢ ciently
small.
p <
(1 + )(M   N +R)
(M   N + F ) (A1)
Where M and N are the collusion and the competitive prot respectively, F
and R are the normal and the leniency-reduced ne, and  is the discount factor.
Denote h = M and di¤erentiate WRT M :
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(1 + )(M   N + F )  (1 + )(M   N +R)
(M   N + F )2 (A2)
This is always non-negative because F  R. Therefore increasing h; the ICC
in Eqn.(A1) relaxes, and rms are more likely to chose not to apply for leniency.
Therefore when leniency is allowed, the probability of detection is a non-increasing
function of h, i.e. L > M > H .
Deterrence This framework also provides an insight into how deterrence changes
with h = M . Denote the deviation prot by D and compare the NC and the CR
and CNR equilibria. CR is sustainable over NC if the probability of investigating a
cartel () is su¢ ciently small:
 <
M   (1  )D   N
M   N +R (A3)
Similarly, CNR dominates NC if  is su¢ ciently small:
 <
(1 + )(M   (1  )D   N)
p(M   N + F ) (A4)
Di¤erentiating the RHS of both conditions WRT M gives:
(D   N) +R + (N   D)
(M   N +R)2 (A5)
and
(1 + )(M   N + F )  (1 + )(M   (1  )D   N)
(M   N + F ))2 (A6)
As D > M > N both expressions show that an increase in h = M relaxes
the ICC of collusion, therefore cartel formation (the complement of deterrence) is an
increasing function of h, and !L > !M > !H .
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A.1.2 Chang and Harrington (2009)
Arguably one of the most compelling theoretical models that analyses cartel deter-
rence in the presence of a CA and leniency programme is by Chang and Harrington
(2009). The model endogenises the level of intervention by the CA as a function of
their resources and workload. In their paper, the incentive compatibility condition
is:
(1 )+[(1 )h+(W (h ))]  (1 )+[W min f; g (h )] (A7)
Where  is the discount factor,  is collusive prot,  is the detection probability,
W and h are the non-collusion and the collusion payo¤s respectively (our notation),
 is a penalty multiplier,  is the mean competitive prot and  is the leniency
multiplier. Analysing (A7), the LHS of the expression shows that if rms collude
they realise prot . With probability (1   ), the cartel is not caught by the CA,
and, given the industry is in the cartel state, the future payo¤ is h With probability
, the cartel is caught and convicted - which leads to a penalty of (h  ) and a
future prot of W . On the RHS the prot from cheating is , which, by denition,
causes the cartel to collapse and earn a future payo¤ of W . A deviating rm will
apply for leniency i¤ the penalty from doing so, (h ); is less than the expected
penalty from not doing, (h  )
To establish how the ICC di¤ers between high-harm and low-harm cartels, we
take the di¤erential of both sides WRT h keeping in mind that  is also a function
of h (assuming that  > , which follows from their discussion):
LHS :

1  @
@h
[h W + (h  )]  (1 + )

h (A8)
RHS :  h
Where, in the brackets, h  W is the incremental value of being in a cartel and
(h ) is the antitrust ne. Therefore increasing h the ICC relaxes (i.e. deterrence
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lessens) if:
1  @
@h
[h W + (h  )]  (1 + )    (A9)
which always holds if @
@h
< 0, which we assume to be true as discussed in Section
4.1.1. Thus !L > !M > !H .
A.1.3 Houba et al. (2012)
An example where leniency is ignored is Houba et al. (2012), who look at a linear
oligopoly model where rms face CA enforcement without leniency but harm depen-
dent detection probability and nes, notably they assume that cartel detection is a
non-decreasing function of h, i.e. L < M < H , which results in the following ICC
(p.40):
1
n
1  kh
1   + hh(2  h) > h(2  h) (A10)
where their p and  have been replaced by our h (harm) and  (detection prob-
ability) for consistency with the notation used in the current paper. By simple
di¤erentiation it can be shown that an increase in h tightens the ICC. Therefore, in
contrast with our Proposition, in the absence of leniency programmes, an increase
in h would deter more, i.e. !L < !M < !H .
A.1.4 Harrington (2005) and Harrington (2004)
Neither of these models allows for leniency, rather, they assume that it is the over-
time price variation that triggers detection and not the level of cartel price itself.30
This leads to very di¤erent results from Houba et al. (2012). In Harrington (2004)
rms choose a collusion price by balancing between maintaining cartel stability and
avoiding the suspicions of the CA. In Harrington (2005) rms face an intertemporal
tradeo¤as higher price in the current period increases current prot but also increases
future detection probability. The ICC in Harrington (2004) is rather complex and
30p.654 in Harrington (2004) and p.152 in Harrington (2005).
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a closed form FOC for the ICC is di¢ cult to reach; however it is clear that the IC
loosens for a higher cartel price as long as the resulting increase in prot exceeds the
increase in the probabilistic magnitude of damages.31 In Harrington (2005, p.160)
the ICC leads to the same conclusion on the relationship between cartel deterrence
and h. Both of these models would therefore conrm that !L > !M > !H .
A.2 Mergers
A.2.1 Baros et al. (2009)
Baros et al. (2009) assume that a merger may lead to pro-competitive and anti-
competitive e¤ects, R and C respectively, where @
R
@h
> 0 and @
C
@h
> 0 and to
avoid corner solutions @
2C
@h2
; @
2R
@h2
< 0 For every merger there is an endogenously
chosen the level of harm h, that has distribution and density functions F (h) and
f(h).The CA clears the merger if h < h, remedies the merger if h < h < h +  and
blocks the merger if h > h+ , where h is the CAs reservation restriction level and
 denotes the extra restrictiveness level the authority is willing to accept as long as
settlements are imposed. K measures the xed cost of building up a merger proposal.
In this setting rms chose h such that:
V = 0 F (h  ) + R(h)[F (h)  F (h  )] + C(h)[1  F (h)] > K (A11)
Eqn.(A11) shows that if h is su¢ ciently small, the merger will not happen, i.e.
!ML  1.
As h increases V changes by:
C0[1  F (h)]  Cf(h) (A12)
Therefore mergers are less likely to be protable at increasing h if:
31p.657 in Harrington (2004).
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ln(C)0 =
C0
C
<
f(h)
1  F (h) = (h) (A13)
Because @
2C
@h2
< 0, as long as it is true for the hazard rate that 00(h) > 0 (a likely
proposition) then the above inequality holds for larger h, therefore !H > !M .
A.2.2 Proving Inference 4
This section provides a proof for Inference 4 when the probability of regulatory
intervention is a function of h. The proof is loosely based on Sorgard (2009). Let
the probability of merger prohibition be (h);where the CA is more likely to prohibit
highly harmful mergers, 0(h) > 0. The anticompetitive prot from merging is given
by h(h), where 0h(h) > 0, and we assume concavity, 
00
h(h) < 0. Also, denote any
increase in prot from e¢ ciency gains by e. Because we are only interested in anti-
competitive cases, we can assume that h > e. If the proportion of anticompetitive
e¤ects that are remedied by the CA is , (determined by the CAs characteristics),
and the cost of the approval procedure is C, the merger will be proposed if:
 = (1  )(h +e   C)  C > 0 (A14)
It is easily shown that this becomes less likely as h increases if:
(1  )0h
0(h)
  e

< h (A15)
Which is true for su¢ ciently high h, therefore !H > !M .
Eqn.(6) also shows that if the anticompetitive prot is very small (h  0)
mergers are deterred if the prot from merging does not exceed the cost of approval.
We appeal to this characteristic to argue that !L  1.
B Alternative population assumption: Paretos curve
Assume as an alternative to the lognormal parametrisation of the population dis-
tribution in the main text, Paretos curve. This also has convenient analytical
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properties, but does not generally generate symmetric Lorenz curves. Because it
is typically found to provide inaccurate ts for the lower tails of most real world
positively skewed size distributions, it is assumed here to t only the medium and
upper tails of the harm distribution.
Formally, suppose that all cases in the population with harm no less than h0 are
distributed according to Paretos Law. A convenient feature of the Law is that it
also applies with any truncation point above h0 so long as the population is redened
accordingly. Therefore, we only require here that h0 should lie within our lower tail.
In that case, with harms above this lower bound normalised by the lower bound,
h = h=h0, the cumulative distribution function, denoting the proportion of cases
with harm less than h is:32
F (h) = 1  (h)  8 h > 1 and  > 1:33 (A16)
Dening the three segments of the population, as in Figure 2, by two critical
levels of harm: hL; the upper limit of the lower tail, and hH the lower limit of the
upper tail, such that hH > hL > h0; then for h = hH=hL:
PH
1  PL = (
hH
hL
)  (A17)
The equation of the Lorenz curve, depicting the proportion of harm caused by
all cases with harm less than h, is:34
1  L(F ) = [1  F )](1 1=) (A18)
Then, for h = hH=h0;where 1 L(F ) = (HH=(1 HL) and 1 F = PH=(1 PL):
HH
1 HL = (
PH
1  PL )
(1 1=) (A19)
In the present base case, for which PL = 0:4; HL = 0:05; PH = 0:05 (a lower tail
accounts for 40% of the population and 5% of the harm, and an upper tail accounts
32We follow Cramers notation and terminology (1971, pp. 51-58).
34Cowell (1977, p.156).
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for 5% of the population), the upper tail share of harm (exclusive of the lower tail)
is:
HH
0:95
= (
0:05
0:6
)(1 1=) (A20)
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